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1. Introduction
In this paper we seek to utilise some of the work of Ball et al. (2003) to review
the interaction between accounting standards, preparer incentives and economic
income in the Czech Republic and the USA.  In particular we focus on the regulatory
and market reactions to particular financial crises: Enron in the USA and Investicni a
Postovni Banka in the Czech Republic. (Jindrichovska et al, 2004)
2. Investicni a Postovni Banka (IPB)
IPB was established in 1990 as a then new Czechoslovak bank and it rapidly
gained market share. The bank management had two strategies from its origin – a
strategy of business development and a strategy of ownership by its own
management. The first strategy led to success in retail banking. At the same time,
however, the credit expansion in the risky environment of a transforming economy
and the conflict of interest within IPB led to a crisis. The bank acted at the same time
as a creditor as well as an owner (through its subsidiaries) of a vast industrial empire.
In 1996 the IPB had problems as an increasing proportion of bad debts in its
portfolio began to appear. IPB was under the pressure of capital inadequacy and it
faced a potential insolvency problem. The bank itself did not perceive any problems
as it felt it had sufficient deposits from individuals. It was alleged in the press (PBJ,
2000a) that Coopers & Lybrand, their auditors, were requesting additional provisions
to cover bad debts for the 1996 year-end.  The bank sacked Coopers & Lybrand and
bought in Ernst and Young who carried out a fresh audit for the 1996 year-end.  The
subsequent accounts for IPB for 1996 showed the bank earning a profit. KPMG were
also asked to tender for the same audit, but according to one of its partners, “in the
time that we were given, we refused to do it”, (PBJ, 2001).  Though the new auditor
in 1997 approved the 1996 annual report, it required the bank to increase its share
capital by 11 bill. CZK. Also, one of the extraordinary audits for the year 1997
showed that the value of the bank was negative. IPB managed to hide these problems
and postpone the day when they would become apparent. However it was clear that
the majority of these problems started already in 1996. (Kudrna et al., 2002)
The Czech state sold its minority share in IPB to Nomura in 1998, hoping to have
found a strategic partner who would help to improve the capital adequacy situation of
IPB by injecting 6 bill CZK. Initially, Nomura’s entry was perceived as a positive
signal and the bank’s deposits increased. Nomura, however, did not act as a strategic
partner. Instead, it concentrated on selling off significant stakes in Czech industrial
companies held in portfolios of investment funds owned and managed by IPB.2
The situation of the bank did not improve and it gradually started loosing
credibility. IPB got into even more dramatic problems in February 2000 when many
creditors started withdrawing short-term deposits. CNB had to impose forced
administration. The situation was finally resolved by selling IPB to CSOB
(Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka). (CNB, 2000c).
2.1 Circular ownership
In general, investment funds that were established by banks during the voucher
privatization could not include banks in their portfolio to prevent circular ownership.
The way around it was to establish an investment management company as a “go
between”. Then the fund could own the bank, which became its “grandmother”. This
was formally legal.
Incestuous ownership was particularly well developed in the IPB Group. The
bank management officially owned negligible percentage of the bank shares, but
through a chain of informal structures, relationships and option agreements it
governed a substantial stake of the bank. And gradually it became an owner de facto
(beneficial owner) even if there were different owners de iure (nominal owners).
‘There was evident management effort to rule the bank through subsidiaries and other
firms mutually owned by bank. The management made various steps (1) to manage
the ownership stakes and (2) to prevent entry of strong strategic investor.’ (Kudrna et
al., 2002; 29)
The Czechoslovak voucher privatization was a big opportunity to increase
management’s influence. IPB was privatized in the first wave of voucher privatization
and various investment privatization funds gained 43% of its shares. Out of this 20%
was directly owned by PIAS (Prvni investicni akciova spolecnost) controlled and
managed by IPB management. Part of the remaining 23% was controlled either by
direct agreement with other investment funds or by the purchase of shares by friendly
companies. Furthermore, the position of the management was strengthened by a
gradual reduction in the state share of ownership. The state minority stake was finally
sold to a Japanese investor, who acted in concert with IPB management. Another
example of cross ownership stemmed from the fact that, the bank acted as both
creditor and owner of many industrial companies. This led to significant conflicts of
interest. The original justification for this behavior was that the bank wanted to
facilitate the reform of Czech industry and merge companies together to establish
viable groups in different sectors.
3. Reaction of regulatory bodies (CNB and the Chamber of Auditors)
Bank supervision incorporates substantial regulatory measures over the banking
sector. However, these measures are largely connected with administrative hearings
conducted through the courts of law. When the central bank wants to try a bank or its
shareholders the CNB has to present sufficiently conclusive proofs. On the other
hand, the Bank Supervision department has rather limited possibilities to react in a
situation where the bank management systematically distorts the information about
economic results and its auditor signs such distorted reports. (CNB, 2000c) During its
final days the IPB obstructed the control procedure. This did not allow the CNB to
identify early and conclusively the real state of the bank. Furthermore, the CNB had
to act very cautiously to avoid damage to IPB, as any decision could lead to
irrevocable changes on the inter-bank market.  Moreover, with regard to the position3
of IPB, the bank’s failure would lead not only to instability in the banking sector but it
would also impact on the economy as a whole.
A Parliamentary Committee criticised the slow reaction of CNB to internal
developments in IPB disregarding the fact that IPB continually misinformed the CNB
by providing information that did not provide a true and fair view on its financial
position. CNB held the opinion that IPB had failed to fulfil its reporting obligations
and that it was the fault of IPB representatives who were responsible for deferring any
effective solution. Even the auditors did not signal the true situation of the bank. For
this reason the CNB started legal proceedings against IPB management. To cope with
a problem of such size and complexity was not within CNB capabilities, as it also
concerned many industrial companies through inter-connected ownership. The CNB
therefore asked the state for support. (CNB, 2000b)
After the collapse of IPB, the Chamber of Auditors also investigated the role of
the auditors in their audit of IPB. ‘It took them almost three years…and finally..the
Czech Chamber’s investigation resulted in a $25,000 fine for Ernst and Young, which
has since replaced its management and drawn closer to the international auditing
firm.’ (PBJ, 2003)
4. The Enron scandal
In October 2001, Enron revealed that there were some problems with the figures
it had reported in its financial statements. Over the next few months these problems
unravelled to reveal one of the largest cases of financial misreporting for some years.
By July 2002, when the USA had enacted new laws to deal with the perceived
inadequacies of the preparation and enforcement of financial reports, Enron’s
auditors, Arthur Andersen had also imploded. Though it is difficult to know as yet the
full extent to which the auditors of Enron up to 2001 had misled the investing public
the damage that was caused to the reputation of Arthur Andersen, though admissions
that they had ‘shredded documents’ amongst other issues, led to their demise as an
international audit firm. (Michaels, 2002)
Public opinion polls in the USA showed rising concern about the quality of
financial information. In March 2002 a third of respondents thought the problem was
confined to a few isolated cases. By June, at least two thirds of them thought most
companies might hide shadow operations. However corporate ethics hardly figures in
the mid term elections yet. The American Enterprise Institute argued there had been
no break in the overall pattern of attitudes to business as a whole, although the
numbers are showing a decline in confidence but no backlash against business as
such. The bubble is deflating rather than bursting. The scandals at Enron, WorldCom
and the rest may simply be too recent to have had their full effect. (The Economist,
July 6, 2002)
Most of the misbehaviour seems to be related in some way to the huge incentives
Wall Street provided in the past decade for reporting rising earnings quarter after
quarter, or rather, earnings that exceeded ever rising expectations. The half dozen
firms, which responded to this incentive “improving” their accounting results, cannot
be the only ones. The likelihood is that many more will emerge.
5. The US regulatory response4
The US regulatory response to the Enron crisis
1 was to enact the Sarbanes Oxley
(SBA) legislation in July 2002. The SBA provided for the setting up of a Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (board).  All accounting firms that prepare
audit reports for issuers in the USA are to register with this board. The board also has
responsibility for establishing rules on auditor independence and any other standards
relating to audit work, inspections of all audit firms and conducting investigations and
disciplinary proceedings where appropriate against accounting firms (Hermsen et al.,
2002). There are also requirements concerning listed company audit committees, the
provision of non-audit services by auditors (detailed prohibitions on the provision by
auditors of particular services such as valuation services and financial systems
design), declarations by directors and executive officers and expanded information in
the filing form for companies (the form 20F). For example, the chief executive officer
and chief financial officer must certify that the form 20-F is materially accurate and
complete and, amongst other aspects, that the information in the report ‘fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial conditions and results of the operations
of the issuer’ (Hermsen et al., 2002:111).  There are also increased penalties for
accounting irregularities and financial fraud.  As stated, ‘the legislation...creates a new
oversight board for the accounting industry, until now a largely self-regulated
profession.’ After a ‘succession of scandals from Enron to WorldCom Accountants
now face a tougher regime. Maximum jail time for executives who commit fraud is
quadrupled to 20 years and a new crime of securities fraud will have a maximum
sentence of 25 years.’ (Guardian Newspapers, 2002).  Over the last 18 months, these
parts of the SBA have come into force.
The crises with Enron, and subsequently WorldCom, in the USA led to a market
response, with a decline in share prices and the demise of Arthur Andersen, and a
regulatory response, the SBA. These were all on a much larger scale than the
responses in the Czech Republic.
6. Monitoring and sanctions in the Czech Republic
Currently, monitoring of financial statements is carried out by three
organisations: the Czech Trade registry, the Czech Securities Commission and the
Czech National Bank.
There is a requirement to file audited financial statements with the Czech Trade
Registry. However, as has been noted in previous research and reports (Sucher and
Zelenka, 1998; ROSC, 2003) though this is a requirement in many cases it is not
observed. In those financial statements, which were filed, some substantial non-
compliance with Czech regulations has also been observed (ROSC, 2003).
The current enforcement of compliance with financial reporting standards, noted
in the Accounting Act, 2001 article 37, was dealt with by the tax inspectorate. In the
Act, 2003, it is now stated that penalties will be levied on accounting units, which are
obliged to prepare IFRS financial reports, and do not do so,
2 and the Tax Inspectorate
should collect these penalties.  The penalties for non-compliance with financial
reporting regulations had been increased to a maximum of 6% of balance sheet gross
assets.
                                                
1 And the issues that arose with financial reporting at WorldCom, where it was revealed that
worthless WorldCom had “improved” its financial results by 3.9 billion dollars through
misrepresenting revenue and assets (Economist, 2002, p.45).
2 article 37(1c) and 37 (2b)5
The Czech Securities Commission also reviews the financial statements of listed
companies for completeness and obvious errors.  On its website it carries all the latest
publications from the Centre for European Securities Regulation (CESR) which
suggest how IFRS compliance should be enforced. On the website, there is a
comment that,
‘The Commission, together with the Ministry of Finance and the Czech
National Bank, is creating conditions for the performance of supervisory
activities over the so-called consolidated financial groups.’
As noted in the FEE survey referred to above, ‘The Czech National Bank
enforces the rules for banks and provides a specific review of certain bank operations
in addition to the common mechanism applied in the case of other enterprises’ (FEE,
2001). However, it is not yet clear what these conditions (referred to on the website
above) might be.  The Commission has certainly not had the technical resources to
enforce accounting standards until now (ROSC, 2003). Therefore a large burden of
the enforcement of compliance falls on the auditors.
7. Conclusion and directions for further research
The regulatory and market responses to the crisis with IPB contrast sharply with
those to the crisis in the USA with Enron. In the Czech Republic, there has been no
major overhaul of either the financial reporting or audit enforcement regime, except in
so far as it related to the conditions for joining the European Union. The audit firm
concerned has not collapsed and disappeared.  Indeed, ironically, it has continued to
grow and has locally absorbed the audit firm, Arthur Andersen that did collapse
following the Enron crisis in the USA.  One could argue that this is a ‘bad thing’,
however, on the other hand, it could indicate that expectations for high quality
financial reporting and enforcement through audit, were never that high in the Czech
Republic, compared to the USA, and investors had other means to assess the worth (or
lack of it) of enterprises. The lack of a properly functioning legal system, capable of
interpreting and enforcing the law is particularly important here.
In the Czech Republic, this latter presumption has particular problems. As our
research on the movement in share prices and the reaction of accounting income to
changes in economic income indicate, there are some odd findings which may
indicate that movements in share prices may not reflect those that would arise in a
semi-strong efficient stock market.
This in part might flow from the particular institutional context in the Czech
Republic – which reflects some of the circularity in the arguments of Ball et al.,
(2003). Where there may be extensive cross holdings of companies, and it is
perceived that enforcement of compliance with financial reporting standards does not
work (Sucher and Kosmala MacLullich, forthcoming) then investors may use
alternative, informal, insider information to establish what is actually happening with
particular enterprises.  The response to the crisis over IPB is an example of this.
There was ample coverage in the local business press of developments at IPB, yet,
unlike with Enron, there was no immediate regulatory response for reasons outlined
above.  It is likely that responses were informal and insider oriented.
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